
by
Lawrence Lessig
|
CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to extend
this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war justified?
In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
our history.
Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
rejection of "piracy" still has play.
There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
Constraining Creators
In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have
done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But
capturing and sharing through digital technology is different. The fidelity
and power are different. You could send an e-mail telling someone
about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you could send the
clip. You could write an essay about the inconsistencies in the arguments
of the politician you most love to hate, or you could make a short
film that puts statement against statement. You could write a poem to
express your love, or you could weave together a string--a mash-up--
of songs from your favorite artists in a collage and make it available on
the Net.
This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and
in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it explodes
the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of
digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily diverse
creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that creativity
is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens
to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture
all around.
Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups, isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a collection
of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same storytelling
extended across the globe.
Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
amoment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
work is presumptively illegal.
That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples
of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It
is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at
the same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of
chapter 3 was just one) were threatened with a $98 billion lawsuit for
building search engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World-
Com--which defrauded investors of $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors
in market capitalization of over $200 billion--received a fine of a
mere $750 million.[1] And under legislation being pushed in Congress
right now, a doctor who negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation
would be liable for no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
suffering.[2] Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this creative
process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
"pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will begin
to see a world of underground art--not because the message is necessarily
political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal
art" tour the United States.[3] In what does their "illegality" consist?
In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
critical or reflective.
Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the changing
law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an even
bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which infractions
can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems discovered in 2002, it
is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get courts to order Internet
service providers to reveal who has what content. It is as if your cassette
tape player transmitted a list of the songs that you played in the privacy
of your own home that anyone could tune into for whatever reason
they chose.
Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web, must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
law regulates such a use.
But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad--in practically
every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice underlying
the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
on the rule of law.
Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
"breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access
the law should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal
system has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors impose
upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon journalists--
these are the real laws governing creativity. And these rules have little
relationship to the "law" with which judges comfort themselves.
For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful infringement
of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to
even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and which would
never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs
she suffered to defend her right to speak--in that world, the astonishingly
broad regulations that pass under the name "copyright" silence
speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes a studied blindness for
people to continue to believe they live in a culture that is free.
As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said
to me,
We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative
people are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are
not being expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made ...you're
not going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind
of permission. That's the point at which they control it.
Constraining Innovators
The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story--creativity
quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't
get you going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and
enough expression that is critical of what seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might think there's little in this story
to worry you.
But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense. Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme promarket
ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at
that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect
by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
fundamental.
The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary--at a
minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to enforce
both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at
least some framework of copyright is also required. But both perspectives
vehemently insist that just because some regulation is good, it
doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both perspectives are
constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation simply enables the
powerful industries of today to protect themselves against the competitors
of tomorrow.
This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases that were
designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a lesson. That les-
son--what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a "nuclear pall" that
has fallen over the Valley--has been learned.
Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not
just to facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also
to facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels, MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity, without
demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable
way to recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative
was to leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend
new artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
Raitt. And so on.
This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences. MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather
this preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The software
would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
wherever you were--at work or at home--you could get access to that
music once you signed into your account. The system was therefore a
kind of music-lockbox.
No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
the kind of content the users liked.
To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,000 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time, and
would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It therefore
purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process of making
copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content from those
copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they had a copy
of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000 copies, it
was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something they had already
bought.
Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels, headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com
settled with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi purchased
MP3.com just about a year later.
That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and
filed a malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that
they had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would
be considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior illegal;
therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared
to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an unspecified
amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in the press)
was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising clients in this
space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of you who believe
the law should be less restrictive should realize that such a view of
the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003, Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
(Hank Barry).[4] The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
recognized the right of the content industry to control how the industry
should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit. So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this forward
for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
United States with bona fide MP3 players....[5]
This is the world of the mafia--filled with "your money or your
life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will obviously
and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start
a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly threatened
by litigation.
The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conservative
than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will systematically
stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some industries
and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
of too much control in the market is to produce an overregulatedregulated
market.
The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
the first important way in which the changes I have described will burden
innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture--a culture
in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the technology
of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Inter-
net's design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this feature
is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
would require computers to determine whether the content they access
is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.[6] Congress
has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory "broadcast
flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright violators
and disable their machines.[7]
In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regulation
of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
those requirements.
In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
impose.[8] Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
harm than good.
There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed innovation--again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
crowd.
Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others. When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
Litman in her book Digital Copyright,[9] overall this history of copyright
is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
The response by the courts has been fairly universal.[10] It has been
mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.[11] But there is one
example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the demise
of Internet radio.
As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"--to memorialize her famous
performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden--
then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current copyright
owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
Marilyn Monroe would not.
The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly. Probably
this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any efforts
to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technology
to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a regular
radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broadcasters
and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
in to this new form of radio.
Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an improvement
potentially vastly more significant than the FM improvement
over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to establish
FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio
in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
number of stations would be limited only by economics and competition
rather than by technical restrictions. ...Armstrong
likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass communications
by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
was broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire
printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
the opportunity to strike off its shackles.[12]
This potential for FM radio was never realized--not because Armstrong
was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"[13] to retard
the growth of this competing technology.
Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
radio?
But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypothetical
Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
"Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
neutral toward Internet radio--the law actually burdens Internet radio
more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
over $1 million a year.[14] A regular radio station broadcasting the same
content would pay no equivalent fee.
The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
- name of the service;
- channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
- type of program (archived/looped/live);
- date of transmission;
- time of transmission;
- time zone of origination of transmission;
- numeric designation of the place of the sound recording
within the program;
- duration of transmission (to nearest second);
- sound recording title;
- ISRC code of the recording;
- release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case
of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copyright
date of the track;
- featured recording artist;
- retail album title;
- recording label;
- UPC code of the retail album;
- catalog number;
- copyright owner information;
- musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
- name of the service or entity;
- 2channel or program;
- date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
- date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
- time zone where the signal was received (user);
- Unique User identifier;
- the country in which the user received the transmissions.
The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains: Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
does not.
Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
Policy at Real Networks, told me,
The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
webcasters asked the RIAA, ..."How do you come up with a
rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
of business "
And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
effective to prevent it.
Corrupting Citizens
Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives dinosaurs
a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
Americans downloaded music in May 2002.[15] According to the RIAA, the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
the world, but against students building search engines, and increasingly
against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more extreme
response by the other.
The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
sued 261 individuals--including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
was.[16] As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
they oppose.
Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We experimented
with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita consumption
of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war against
drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent of its
preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition, consumption was
up to 70 percent of the preprohibition level. Americans were drinking
just about as much, but now, a vast number were criminals.[17] We have
launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.[18] That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of the
population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast majority
of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.[19] We
pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of ordinary
behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a huge proportion
of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told
a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students
who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and
sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven
cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the
norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how
to behave ethically--how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that
your case is over. Generations of Americans--more significantly in
some parts of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America
today--can't live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally"
entails a certain degree of illegality.
The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how
to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both intended
and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and
collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much greater than
the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason to consider the
alternative.
My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations, but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law
depends upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect
the law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law or
not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether
my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law sow increasing
disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet introduced
this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to call these
twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
When at least forty-three million citizens download content from
the Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be asking
is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be
whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve
the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to
assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three million
Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other ways to
assure that artists get paid without transforming America into a nation
of felons?
This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These
pieces of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copyright
infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used
record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
recordings is free.
But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy, or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn" capacities
of digital technologies.
This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful program
called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others--the
potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with play lists that is itself independently
valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and meaningful
in their own right.
This use is enabled by unprotected media--either CDs or records. But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
(or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair
return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experiment
with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or
they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content on people's
machines.
If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in
hacker circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights management"
system.
If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to interfere
with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what
if there were another way to assure that artists are paid, without locking
down any content? What if, in other words, a different system
could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom
to move content easily?
My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now, the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system
achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright system
achieved, but left consumers and creators much more free, then
we'd have a very good reason to pursue this alternative--namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would not be between property and
piracy; the choice would be between different property systems and the
freedoms each allowed.
I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turning
forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature
of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for
producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today
control the vast majority of the distribution of content in the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go
the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already
saddled Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against
this new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not understandable
why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a tradition
as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly important
to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann
describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises whenever you turn
a very large percentage of the population into criminals." This is the
collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
"If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
explains,
then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evaporate
to one degree or another.... If you're a copyright infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright
infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of your
computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
access? ...Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this
campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage
of the American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the
RIAA launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn
over the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating
copyright law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request
to a judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the
identity of an Internet user is revealed.
The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general
strategy to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a fam-
ily's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the
family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop the
RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
Jesse Jordan.[20]
Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.[21] Using a sophisticated
hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a fingerprint of
every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those MP3s will
have the same "fingerprint."
So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
friend gives a CD to your daughter--a collection of songs just like the
cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does
your daughter, where these songs came from. But she copies these
songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to college and
connects it to a college network, and if the college network is "cooperating"
with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't properly protected
her content from the network (do you know how to do that yourself?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning to deploy,[22] your
daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead
that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that
they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes
her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat this "contraband"
as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students
have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
Says von Lohmann,
So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog
where you could randomly choose any person off the street and be
confident that they were committing an unlawful act that could
put them on the hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of
millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but
speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit
civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the closest
analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has
eroded all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many Americans
as criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing
is an order of magnitude larger number of Americans than drug
use. ... If forty to sixty million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a slippery slope to lose a lot of civil
liberties for all forty to sixty million of them.
When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals"
under the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective--
securing rights to authors--without these millions being considered
"criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted effort through
our democracy to change our law?
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