
by
Lawrence Lessig
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CHAPTER SIX: Founders
William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that Shakespeare
had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's adaptation
of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
"copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.[1] Tonson was the
most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger[2] who
controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to produce
better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years, renewable
once if the author was alive, and that all works already published
by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.[3] Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
was--indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights. The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had expired
in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to govern
how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures "positive
law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had expired
was whether the common law protected a copyright, independent
of any positive law.
This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand ultimately
resulted in the Statute of Anne.
The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation, however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright "expired,"
and the work would then be free and could be published by
anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
(that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What reason
is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
"booksellers."
First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade others
from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go beyond
that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
perform, and so on.
So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the permission
of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
to print--no less, of course, but also no more.
Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British. They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights," especially
"exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out monopolies--especially monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
publishing.
Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from specialinterest
favors; they passed a law to stop them.
Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers. Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind--tools of the
Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee themselves
a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."[4]
Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
that idea.
To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a compromise
to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
construction and spread of culture.
When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough, they said; they needed more time.
Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
words that echo today,
I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be establishing
a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement
to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
of the Booksellers.[5]
Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
protections were not intended as replacements for the common law. Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law. Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's creative
"property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the protections
of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
authors.
This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
publishers ... had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
for cattle."[6] The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author.
His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight. The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
Donaldson.[7]
Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
under the Statute of Anne.[8] Donaldson's publishing house prospered
and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."[9]
When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."[10] His
books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements
of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection
of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.[11]
Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held, extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates." Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common
law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
control the publication of any book assigned to them.
Considered as a matter of abstract justice--reasoning as if justice
were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles--Mansfield's
conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
Thomas Beckett.[12] Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar, got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
statute were no longer protected.
The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords," members
of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
Lords generally voted.
The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts, it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights. Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright
was fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
passed into the public domain.
"The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in Anglo-
American history, the legal control over creative works expired, and the
greatest works in English history--including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan--were free of legal restraint.
It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland, where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in Edinburgh
upon victory over literary property: bonfires and illuminations."[13]
In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle reported:
By the above decision ... near 200,000 pounds worth of what
was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
after many years industry thought they had acquired a competency
to provide for their families now find themselves without a
shilling to devise to their successors.[14]
"Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in England
would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an exclusive
right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop--
chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
the many.
At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less protected.
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